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THE FUTURE OF ENTERPRISE
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Orts*

OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE . By Henry Hansmann. Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996 . Pp. xi, 36 3. $39. 95.
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996 . Pp. vi, 376 .

INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND

By

G.P. Stapledon.
$98.

Both the law and business schools at the University of Michigan
offer a basic course in Enterprise Organization. This tradition owes
to the influence of Professor Alfred Conard, one of the leading
scholars of his generation, who taught during most of his career at
the University of Michigan Law School.1 The tradition persists in
part because Enterprise Organization suggests an appropriately
broad view of its topic, unlike more common course titles such as
Corporations or Business Ass9ciations. We live in a world popu
lated not only by people but also the organized legal entities we
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Penn
sylvania; VISiting Professor of Law, University of Leuven (1998) and University of Michigan
(1997). B.A. 1982, Oberlin; M.A. 1985, New School for Social Research; J.D. 1988, Michigan;
J.S.D. 1991, Columbia. - Ed. I thank Al Conard and Henry Hansmann for co=ents but
emphasize that any errors are mine.

1. See ALFRED F. CoNARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND
ANALYSIS ON EMPLOYMENT, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AssocIATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS
(4th ed. 1987).
As Professor Conard tells the story, the development of Enterprise Organization had
several influences. Letter from Alfred Conard, Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, emeritus,
University of Michigan, to Eric Orts, Apr. 6, 1998 (on file with author). First, as a law stu
dent, he took separate courses in Agency, Partnership, and Corporations, each organized in
schematic rather than economic terms. He was introduced to a more integrated treatment
during a year of graduate study for a J.S.D. at Columbia University when he came across a
casebook by Magill and Hamilton. See RoswsLL FoSTER MAGILL & ROBERT P. HAMILTON,
Bus1NESs AssocIATIONS (1933-35). When teaching at the University of Illinois, Conard pub
lished a casebook combining agency and partnership. See Al.FRED F. CONARD ET AL.,
AGENCY, AssOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT LICENSING & PARTNERSHIPS (1972). When he
moved to Michigan, he taught a course in Business Associations through a casebook by
Laylin James. See LAYLIN JAMES, BuslNESs AssocIATIONS (2d ed. 1947). Conard believes
James's text was the first to interweave agency, partnership, and corporate law in an inte
grated course; at least it influenced him to adopt this framework for his own casebook.
Meanwhile, back at Columbia, Berle and Warren changed the name of their course to Busi
ness Organizations. See A.A. BERLE & WILLIAM C. WARREN, BuslNESs ORGANIZATIONS
(1948). Conard's contributions were to put these influences together and to adopt the word
"enterprise" - partly to comprehend nonprofit organizations, partly to capture the eco
nomic idea of an "undertaking," and partly to include problems in securities regulation. See
Letter, supra.
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create. Business firms and nonprofit organizations have legal
frameworks, and economic forces affect them in various ways. An
important topic for social research - including not only law and
economics, but also other disciplines - is to uncover the springs of
motivation, power, and belief that underlie the organizations that
figure so largely in our everyday·existence.
The Ownership of Enterprise and Institutional Shareholders and
Corporate Governance confirm Professor Conard's broad view of
the subject of Enterprise Organization, though they travel in two
different directions. One direction focuses on what may be called
the "microanalysis of institutions, " which breaks down complex
forms of organization in· terms of their elements - namely, individ
uals and their motivations. 2 The other direction focuses on the big
picture, a "macroanalysis of society" and its major developmental
changes. These two directions correspond roughly with the func
tional differentiation between micro- and macroeconomics. In my
estimation, the same division of labor makes sense in studying the
law of enterprise organization and characterizes its likely future.
I. THE MI CROANALYSIS

OF

ENTERPRI SE

In The Ownership of Enterprise, Professor Henry Hansmann 3
collects the themes of a number of major contributions in his ex
traordinarily productive career. He combines law and economics in
a refreshing and undogmatic fashion to explore the elemental
forces that drive enterprise to be structured in various ways.
Hansmann's choice of topics is eclectic, but this range derives from
the impressive scope of his research. He is perhaps best known for
his scholarship on employee ownership,4 a fact that explains his
continuing interest in the worker-owned manufacturing enterprises
of the Mondragon system in Spain (pp. 98- 103), as well as experi
ments in worker ownership at United Airlines and Weirton Steel in
the United States (pp. 107, 1 17- 18). His discussion of the ownership
of golf courses (pp. 184-85) gives a case study in the analysis of
"status organizations," which includes his own Yale Law School.5
In short, The Ownership of Enterprise is worth reading if only for
2. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HAR.v. L. REv. 1393, 1425-29 (1996).
3. Sam Harris Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
4. See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990); Henry Hansmann,
Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589 (1993).
5. See Henry Hansmann, A Theory of Status Organizations, 2 J.L. EcoN. & 0Ro. 119
(1986). Hansmann offers a humbling account for professors of the reasons students choose to
attend elite universities - namely, "with an eye to the intelligence, previous education, social
attractiveness, athletic ability, and future promise of its other students" and "for the sake of
developing contacts that are later useful in life," rather than "the quality of the instructional
program." Pp. 185-86. Faculty similarly are motivated to join schools "not only, or even
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the purpose of appreciating the depth and breadth of Hansmann's
scholarship to date.6
But the book also offers much more. It brings together a ca
reer's worth of thinking into a general thesis about how the world
of enterprise organization works. Hansmann's main argument is
that broad generalizations cannot be made about the most efficient
or desirable structure of ownership in free enterprise societies. The
"investor ownership" model of capitalism that puts shareholders
and creditors at the center is "contingent" on the economics of en
terprise, legal and political structures, changing technologies, and
cultural differences (pp. 1-4, 287-88, 294-97).
Hansmann develops this thesis through an empirical analysis of
various kinds of enterprise that do not fit the model of investor
owned firms. He then provides an economic explanation for the
ownership structure of enterprise in terms of two criteria: the costs
of contracting and the costs of ownership.7 Unlike other economic
theorists who assume that a capitalist model of investor ownership
always makes better sense than other modes of organization,
Hansmann recognizes a plurality of forms of enterprise. At the
same time, he offers a "comparative study of organizational types"
that explains why investor ownership is common in most, if not all,
forms of business enterprise (p. 3).
A.

The Costs of Contracting

Hansmann is a contractarian economist to the extent that he
adopts a view of the firm as "a nexus of contracts" or, more pre
cisely, as "the common signatory of a grpup of contracts" (p. 18).
The costs of contracting therefore figure largely in his explanation
for the structure of enterprise. There are at least six sources
of
,
these costs.

1. Simple market power includes both monopoly power of a
firm with respect to its customers and monopsony power with re
spect to a firm's suppliers (pp. 24-25). The costs of market power
provide a strong incentive for a potentially exploited group to exert
influence to reduce the costs of dealing with a monopoly or monop
sony through direct ownership or public regulation. For example,
customers of electricity or telephone services who find themselves
threatened with monopoly pricing may seek cooperative or public
primarily, on the basis of work conditions such as salary and teaching load, but also on the
basis of the professional accomplishments of the other members of the faculty." P. 192.
6. The primary articles from which the book draws are listed, p. 363, and other articles
are dispersed in various footnotes.
7. Pp. 20-22, 287. See also Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. EcoN. &
267 (1988) (introducing the basic concepts on which The Ownership of Enterprise
elaborates).
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ownership of the utility or lobby for regulation of prices (pp. 16870, 176-80). Farmers who face monopsony pricing by cartels of
grain purchasers may bypass them through cooperative ownership
of grain elevators or cooperative marketing firms (pp. 122-25).
2. Lock-in refers to dependent relationships that may arise be
tween various groups that contract with a firm over a long period of
time (p. 25). For example, an individual who works for one firm
may develop firm-specific human capital that cannot be transferred
to another. Lock-in may provide an explanation for why some
firms become employee-owned (p. 26), though Hansmann does not
find empirical evidence to corroborate this view and concludes that
other factors must play a greater role (pp. 71-72). Lock-in also ex
plains, at least partially, the vertical integration of firms with their
suppliers and distributors.8
3. Long-term contracting risks refer to the well-known problem
that uncertainty increases as the duration of a contract lengthens.
An example is life insurance (p. 27). Before advances in actuarial
science and regulatory changes made investor-owned life insurance
viable, mutual ownership of life insurance companies by the policy
holders made sense because the contractual terms could be changed
and the proceeds distributed as the future - and life expectancy grew ever more certain with time (pp. 266-74).
4. Asymmetric information and strategic bargaining refer to a
general problem involved in any complex economic enterprise:
some groups have more accurate and complete information than
others (pp. 27-29). Groups with better information enjoy a better
bargaining position. A firm's managers, for example, often have
better information than customers about the firm's products. If no
other solution is found - such as consumer protection legislation
or product liability rules - the costs of asymmetric information
may lead customers to acquire ownership in the firm. For example,
farmers band together in supply cooperatives to solve the problem
of asymmetric information about the quality of feed and fertilizer.9
8. Pp. 26-27. For economic treatments of vertical integration, see Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. PoL. EcoN. 691 (1986); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978).
9. Pp. 28, 149-51. A similar analysis explains the economic motivation for some worker
ownership structures. If a firm's managers see employees as merely "tools" or "factors of
production," the managers have an incentive to withhold essential information from their
employees, including any labor unions, in order to improve their bargaining position and
enhance returns for investors. From the workers' point of view, a seat on the board for a
labor representative or an employee buyout may reduce the costs of this informational asym
metcy. Pp. 29, 70-73. From the perspective of outside investors, the converse is true: reduc
ing the asy=etcy of information vis-a-vis workers may increase the costs of supplying
capital to these firms.
Hansmann argues persuasively, however, that the "conventional wisdom that employee
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5. Conflicts of interest describe the inevitable costs of meeting
the demands of the diverse groups of people involved in most en
terprises. These costs grow larger as an enterprise increases in size
and complexity. Hansmann emphasizes the importance of resolv
ing conflicts among whom he calls the "patrons" of the firm. Pa
trons "comprise all persons who transact with a firm either as
purchasers of the firm's products or as sellers �o the firm of sup
plies, labor, or other factors of production."10 Even within one
group of patrons, interests can diverge. Among employees, for ex
ample, older workers may prefer lower-risk policies than younger
workers who may accept greater risk in return for higher wages (p.
3 1). Or older workers with retirement savings invested in pensions
or employee stock ownership plans may ally themselves more
closely with investors than with younger workers (p. 90). Balancing
the interests of patrons is central to structuring the ownership of
enterprise. Hansmann concludes that the proper structure depends
on the particular circumstances of an enterprise and the relative
costs for patrons who have an interest in it.

6. Alienation, a concept from social psychology, refers to the
tendency of workers in modem industrial societies to fe el detached
from the purpose of their work and therefore unmotivated.11
Hansmann recognizes market contracting to be "adversarial" and
sometimes "unpleasant." Many people prefer "relationships that
are more cooperative, trusting, or altruistic" (p. 32). The motivaownership is poorly suited to capital-intensive industries" is overstated. P. 75. Employees
may often agree to supply capital even in the face of increased and nondiversified risk, and a
great deal of financing may be obtained through debt rather than outside e quity. Pp. 75-76.
10. P. 12. Other commentators refer to the various interests in firms as stakeholders, but
Hansmann wants to avoid the ideological baggage that this term sometimes carries. He says
that those who use the term "stakeholders" to include "workers, customers, suppliers, mem
bers of the local community, and environmental groups" believe these groups "should have
representation on the firm's board of directors." P. 44. In fact, the literature on stakeholder
management theory is more diverse, and much of it at least purports to be more descriptive
than normative. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 65 {1995);
Eric W. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management Theory, in
PERSPECilVES ON COMPANY LAW: 2 165 {Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997). The under
standing of "stakeholder" as one who bears a risk in an enterprise seems roughly synony
mous with Hansmann's "patron." To my knowledge, Hansmann's reference to "patrons" is
unique, but it is no worse than "stakeholder." One might also refer simply to various "inter
ests" in an enterprise. For convenience and to avoid confusion, however, I adopt
Hansmann's use of "patrons" in this review.
11. This definition offers only one possible meaning of the complex idea of alienation,
which has roots in religious thought as well as in the social theories of Rousseau, Hegel, and
Marx. See ADAM ScHAFF, ALIENATION AS A SocIAL PHENOMENON 24-55 {1980). Another
commentator observes that alienation is "used to denote a great variety of often quite dissim
ilar phenomena . . .. within separate disciplines," including anthropology, economics, educa
tional theory, literature, philosophy, political science, and sociology. Frank Johnson,
Alienation: Overview and Introduction, in ALIENATION: CONCEPT, TEru.r, AND MEANINGS 3,
6-25 {Frank Johnson ed., 1973). Hansmann does not specify exactly what he means by aliena
tion, but the general sense suggested in the text serves as an approximation.
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tions of some people to be sheltered from the storms of constant
market contracting and to avoid feeling alienated therefore explain
some forms of enterprise organization. Although Hansmann avoids
deeper ideological controversy about the concept of alienation, it is
to his credit that he sees the phenomenon as important. Psycholog
ical preferences and social conditions, as well as calculations about
economic efficiency, .affect the structure of enterprise.
B.

The Costs of Ownership

Although Hansmann emphasizes the costs of contracting, he
recognizes that ownership also has costs. The costs of ownership
combine with the costs of contracting to determine the structure of
enterprise. These costs of ownership fall into four general types:
controlling managers, collective decisionmaking, risk bearing, and
organizational transition.

1. The costs of controlling managers. Because Hansmann ar
gues that any group of patrons can own a firm in terms of rights to
residual profits - whether the owners are shareholders, creditors,
employees, or some combination - he portrays managers as a
nearly universal cost of ownership.12 This account is a refreshing
reversal of the usual economic focus on the agency costs of employ
ees and other lower-level functionaries.13
The costs of controlling managers divide into monitoring and
Monitoring includes costs of information
(finding out what managers are doing), communication (finding out
what an often dispersed group of patron-owners want), and en
forcement (getting managers to follow the patron-owners' prefer
ences) (p. 36). Managerial opportunism refers to the possibility
that managers will "malinger or engage in self-dealing transactions"
(p. 37). A management leveraged buyout, for example, presents
this kind of risk.14

managerial opportunism.

12. Some enterprises may dispense with managers if they are sufficiently small.
13. Alternatively, managers might also be described as patrons of the firm, a subclass of
employees, and they may even purchase ownership of the firm, such as in a management
leveraged buyout (MBO). In a MB O, the managers of a corporation buy a controlling equity
interest from the shareholders, which is usually financed through increased debt. MB Os thus
leverage the remaining e quity (now owned by managers) with a higher debt-to-equity ratio.
See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged
Recapitalizations, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 517, 519-24 (1988). Hansmann does not discuss MBOs,
but presumably he could account f or this kind of transaction in terms of managers-as-em
ployees becoming managers-as-owners. The costs of controlling managers would be repli
cated for the new managers-as-owners, though an economic benefit of MBOs is arguably to
reduce these costs.
14. See Victor Bradney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1425-26 (1985); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:
How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U CLA L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (1997).
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2. Collective decisionmaking among patrons who participate in
the governance of a firm imposes costs relating to "differences of
opinion concerning the firm's policies and programs" (p. 39). These
costs "result from heterogeneity of interests among the owners" (p.
40). They are "logically distinct" from the agency costs of managers
because managers impose agency costs regardless of ownership
structure (p. 39). According to Hansmann, the costs of collective
decisionmaking often determine which group of patrons - inves
tors, employees, suppliers, or customers
will assume ownership
(p. 288).
-

The general rule of collective decisionmaking, subject to other
costs of contracting and ownership, is that the most homogenous
and unconflicted group in an enterprise will become its owners.
One important implication is that collective decisionmaking costs
will impede employee ownership in most situations of any complex
ity (pp. 91, 119). A corollary is that the relative uniformity of the
interests of investors - "to maximize the net present value of the
firm's earnings" - often provides an advantage for investor-owned
enterprise (p. 62). At the same time, the interests of investors may
conflict. For example, shareholders often have a greater tolerance
for risk than creditors. Preferences may also vary within patron
groups, such as among shareholders or different creditors.15

3. Risk bearing refers to the ability to bear the financial risk of
loss. Ownership of an enterprise will tend to fall to the patrons who
are best able "to bear those risks - for example, through diversifi
cation" (pp. 44-45). The ability to bear and diversify risks leads in
most circumstances to investor ownership (p. 57). Although some
commentators argue that this factor explains the relative scarcity of
employee ownership, Hansmann argues that the empirical evidence
does not support the claim.16 One reason is that at least for non
unionized "at will" employees, the financial risks of layoffs often
equal or exceed the risks of ownership (pp. 78-79).
4. Entrepreneurship and the costs of transition. Although
Hansmann argues that the most efficient structures of enterprise
15. For two competing views of preferences among shareholders, compare Henry T.C.
Hu, Risk, Tzme, and Fiduciary Principles in'Corporate Investment, 38 U C L A L. REv. 277,
287, 389 (1990) (recognizing shareholders may have different preferences toward risk, but
recommending "blissful shareholder wealth maximization" as a standard f or enforcement of
fiduciary duties) with Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Cor
porate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CALL. REv. 1021, 1025-29 (criticizing the abstract
conception of "fictional shareholders" with only wealth-maximizing preferences as dehuman
izing). Shareholders' preferences
also diverge to the extent that some shareholders may
also be managers, rank-and-file employees, or creditors. With respect to creditors, prefer
ences
vary in accordance with risk, including such factors as interest rates and whether
the debt obligations involved are secured, subordinated, or convertible into e quity.

will

will

16. P. 45. Counterexamples include worker ownership in relatively risky enterprises such
as farming, investment banking, and the plywood industry. P. 78.
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will win out in the long run (pp. 287, 295-96), he recognizes that the
start-up costs of organizing a firm and the costs of transferring own
ership from one group of patrons to another can raise barriers to
otherwise desirable ownership structures.17 Such transitional trans
actions entail costs that may outweigh the gains to be achieved by
the change.18 The costs of transition, in other words, result in some
degree of path dependence.19
Hansmann notes two sources of organizational inertia. First,
"the presence of established brokers who specialize in ownership
transactions" and "standardized procedures for handling those
transactions" are needed to reduce the costs of transition (p. 46).
Corporate lawyers and investment bankers, for example, are often
needed to serve as transactional engineers to change ownership
structure.20 Second, those who benefit from current ownership
structures often entrench themselves, even when change would be
in the best interests of other patrons of the firm (p. 46). To para
phrase the Delaware Supreme Court, there is an omnipresent risk
that a controlling group may act primarily in its own interest rather
than the interests of the enterprise as a whole.21

17. A co=on route for the growth of an enterprise in the United States is to fund a
closely held corporation initially through venture capital and then, when the firm has become
established, "going public" through an initial public offering to shareholders. P. 45. See also
Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of the Capital Mar
kets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fm. Econ. 243 (1998) (exploring the functional link
between venture capital and stock markets, especially the role of the initial public offering);
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital
and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 865 (1997) (compar
ing the entrepreneurial approach of the United States with Japan's system). Other kinds of
transitions include the purchase of a firm by its employees, suppliers, or customers through
leveraged transactions or otherwise. The employee buyout of United Airlines, for example,
was a leveraged transaction. See Ezra R. Field, Note, Money for Nothing and Leverage for
Free: The Politics and History of the Leveraged ESOP Subsidy, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 740, 74951 & n.77 (1997).
18. For example, a leveraged transaction may provide efficiency gains through the struc
tural power of increased debt to discipline managers. For an overview of this functional use
of debt, see George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corpo
rate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073 (1995). However, if the transaction costs of changing
the capital structure exceed the economic gains anticipated through increased leverage, then
the transitional transaction needed to improve the organizational structure will not take
place.
19. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
641, 643-62 (1996) (discussing concept of path dependence).
20. Cf. Ronald
Pricing, 94 YALE

HARV. L.

J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
L.J. 239, 243, 253-55 (1984) (describing lawyers as "transaction cost

engineers").
21.

See Unocal

REv.

Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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Explaining the Structure of Ownership in the Real World

Hansmann offers a rich and knowledgeable empirical account of
the current structure of enterprise organization in addition to his
theoretical analysis of the costs of contracting and ownership. He
explodes the myth that capitalism inevitably follows a paradigm of
investor ownership by showing how the world is populated by a va
riety of ownership structures. Rather than a monotonous world of
enterprises owned always by a class of capitalist investors, there are
a number of competing organizational forms.
For example, firms that offer professional services are often
owned by the same people who do the professional work, including
doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, management
consultants, and investment bankers (p. 67). Hansmann overstates
the point when he says that these firms are "among the world's
purest examples of employee ownership," given their usual hierar
chical structure.22 But his general point is well taken. Partners in
professional firms are not. equivalent t9 outside capital investors.
Other examples of employee ownership dot the contemporary
landscape. Taxi cab companies are often employee-owned, as are
some garbage removal companies (p. 67). Experiments in em
ployee ownership of large enterprises are underway in the United
States and Europe.23 The expansion of employee stock ownership
plans, the popularity of profit-sharing plans, and European
codetermination show at least the potential for substantial em
ployee participation in ownership and governance of business en
terprise in the future.24
22. P. 67. Most professional firms of doctors, lawyers, and others are very hierarchical in
depending on a number of lower-level employees, including nurses, paralegals, and clerical
staff. They also often conduct a "tournament" or "winner-take-all" competition among en
try-level professionals for advancement to status as equity owners - for example, associates
in law firms competing to "make partner." See MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TIIE BIG LAW FIRM 100-02, 137
(1991); ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. CooK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 7-8 (1995).
23. See supra text accompanying note 4. Hansmann points out, however, that some cases
often cited as involving employee ownership, including the Avis rental car company, Norton
publishers, and the failed PeopleExpress airline, are not in fact employee-controlled. In
stead, a small group of top-level managers control these firms, and rank-and-file employees
participate only as equity investors without effective voting power. P. 108.
24. Pp. 105-12. For an optimistic view of the economic prospects for employee owner
ship, see Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 159, 162-63
(1991). On the expanding use of ESOPs, see JosEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN
KRusE, THE NEW OWNERS: THE MAss EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC
CoMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BusINESs (1991). On the increasing use of
profit-sharing plans, see Martin L. Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and
Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LooK AT TIIE EVIDENCE 95 (Alan S. Blinder
ed., 1990). For an introduction to the codetermination debate that remains salient in Europe,
see Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for
Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 203
(1994); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with
Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1338 (1984).
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Less familiar examples - at least to urban dwellers - expand
one's perspective of enterprise ownership in other directions. Mar
keting cooperatives are the rule in agriculture. Ocean Spray cran
berries, Sunkist oranges, Sun Maid raisins, Land O'Lakes butter,
and Welch's grape juice are all marketing and processing coopera
tives rather than integrated firms owned by investors (p. 12 1). Con
sumer cooperatives for the supply of livestock feed, seed, fertilizer,
and pesticides are also common in farming (p. 149).
Even in urban environments, non-investor-owned enterprises
are plentiful. True-Value, Ace, and Servistar are retailer-owned
hardware wholesale cooperatives (pp. 157-58, 336 n.23). Associated
Press is a cooperative owned by thousands of participating newspa
pers and broadcasting networks (p. 158). MasterCard and Visa are
also cooperatives owned by hundreds of participating banks.25
What explains these departures from the norm of investor
owned firms in capitalist societies? For example, why are some util
ities provided by public or consumer cooperatives rather than in
vestor-owned firms? Why are some banks and hospitals organized
as nonprofits and others investor-owned? Why is selling cranber
ries, oranges, raisins, butter, and grape juice like selling news stories
and credit cards?
Like the reviewer of a good mystery, I will leave these questions
unanswered. Suffice it to say here that Hansmann suggests answers
along the lines of comparative costs of contracting and ownership.
Those who examine these specific areas of enterprise organization
as well as those who wish to argue for alternatives, such as worker
ownership or consumer cooperatives, should consult his arguments.
In each case, Hansmann gives economic arguments that favor inves
tor ownership, but he also addresses the most obvious objections
In Hansmann's analysis, employee ownership proves superior to traditional investor
owned enterprises in some circumstances. Employee ownership tends to reduce costs of
lock-in, asymmetric information, alienation, and controlling managers. The benefits of em
ployee ownership are often offset, however, by other costs - especially when firms grow
large. Diverse groups of employee-owners tend to increase the costs of collective decision
making and risk bearing. See supra sections I.A, I.B. Strong empirical evidence of employee
ownership in some businesses suggests that competition between employee-owned and inves
tor-owned enterprises will continue in the future, and the mix will fluctuate according to
changing economic, legal, technological, and cultural conditions. For a recent economic anal
ysis of employee ownership emphasizing its role in corporations, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Em
ployee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of United Airlines, in
CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 437 (Sloan Project on Corporate Governance, Columbia
Law School, May 1998).
25. Pp. 158-59. Note, however, that the cooperatives in hardware, news, and credit cards
are almost always controlled by members who are investor-owned enterprises. Hansmann
does not always distinguish between integrated firms and groups of firms. For example, the
banks issuing Visa cards and newspapers using Associated Press reports are mostly investor
owned. This observation undercuts the implication that might otherwise follow from
Hansmann's analysis that investor-owned enterprises do not constitute the vast majority of
business firms.
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that pure free-enterprise spirits may raise to his claim that investor
ownership is not always the most efficient form of enterprise. He
considers the possibilities that regulatory bias in the form of tax
breaks, antitrust rules, or special subsidies may skew the structure
of enterprise away from an ideal of investor ownership. In the end,
Hansmann argues persuasively that a mix of economic factors com
bine to produce the diversity of ownership forms that we observe in
the real world.
II.

SOME

CRITICISMS OF lIANsMANN'S ACCOUNT OF
ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION

I tum now to offer several constructive criticisms of Hansmann's
microanalysis of enterprise. The first two are broadly theoretical.
A third focuses on the concept of ownership in nonprofit organiza
tions. The last reconsiders the role of the business corporation.
A.

The Benefits of Organization

Although Hansmann provides a detailed account of the costs of
enterprise organization, he omits a description of the benefits. He is
correct that the forms of enterprise that we observe in free market
societies are determined in part by the relative costs of contracting
and ownership. The benefits of organization, however, are also
considerable. They include not only the psychological fact that peo
ple often like to work together,26 but also the increased productivity
achieved through specialization and the division of labor within au
thoritative structures.27 Organized enterprise often represents "a
social community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the cre
ation and transfer of knowledge."28 Economies of scale and scope
are also important.29 Considering the benefits as well as the costs
26. In this respect, Hansmann's treatment of the cost of alienation might be restated as a
benefit. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
27. For classic economic theories that emphasize the benefits of specialization, see FRANK
KNIGHT, RrsK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 271 (1964) (1st ed. 1921) (describing the "mani
fold specialization of function" in business enterprise); 1 KARL MARx, CAPITAL: A CRI·
TIQUE OF PoLmCAL EcoNOMY 368-94 (Samuel Moore &·Edward Aveling trans., Random
House 1906) (1st ed. 1859) (describing the economic benefits of specialization in capitalist
manufacturing); 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 7-16 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1st ed. 1776) (including the
famous example of specialization of labor in pin-making). In fairness, Hansmann alludes to
one benefit of specialization, though again negatively as a cost: the ability to bear risk. See
supra text accompanying note 16.

28. Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Leaming,
7 0Ro. Ser. 502, 503 (1996).
29. "[E]conomies of scale" are "those that result when the increased size of a single oper
ating unit producing or distributing a single product [or service] reduces the unit cost of
production or distribution," and "economies of scope" are "[e]conomies of joint production
or distribution" that result "from the use of processes within a single operating unit to pro-
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of organization would provide a more comprehensive explanation
for the ownership of enterprise than Hansmann provides.
B.

The Concept of Ownership

Hansmann's treatment of the concept of ownership in enterprise
organization is somewhat flawed - or at least unclear. He argues
that ownership "has two essential attributes: exercise of control
and receipt of residual earnings" (p.35). He further maintains that
"outright ownership of assets is not an essential aspect of what we
call a firm" (p. 19), though he sees the various costs of ownership to
be important. Unlike Hansmann, I believe that the concept of own
ership of assets and property in organizations deserves a higher
profile.30
Consider a hypothetical with which Hansmann supports his ar
gument that some forms of enterprise have no ownership. He
imagines a sports team in which the "only assets are contracts, " in
cluding "(a) an exclusive claim on the services . . . of a group of
football players and a coach, (b) access to a stadium ...(c) and the
right to play, and divide receipts from, a series of games against
other teams . . . " (p.301 n.16 ). Notwithstanding the doubtful as
sumption that such a team would not own any equipment - for
example, uniforms, pads, helmets, and even footballs - the hypo
thetical includes a property right: the rental of the stadium, not to
mention television rights. Hansmann implies that a lease does not
amount to a property interest as well as a contract.31 This view
would represent a constricted concept of ownership.32
Despite Hansmann's claim that "ownership of a firm need have
nothing to do with title to assets or with investment or ownership of
duce or distribute more than one product [or service]." .Al.FRED D. CHANDLER, ScALE AND
THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 17 (1990).
30. For economic accounts of enterprise that emphasize property rights of ownership, see
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CoNTRAcrs, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-72 (1995); Grossman &
Hart, supra note 8; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature ofthe Firm, 98
J. PoL. EcoN. 1119 (1990). See also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 317-79
(1990) (advancing a theory of corporations involving property rights); Tamar Frankel, The
Legal Infrastmcture ofMarkets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389
(1993) (emphasizing property as well as contracts); Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A
Legal Theory ofthe Firm, 16 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 264 (1998) (combining legal concepts of
agency, contracts, and property in a theory of enterprise organization).
31. That a leasehold does not represent ownership of a "real" property interest is a feudal
notion. Nemo potest esse dominllS et tenens ("No man can be both tenant and lord."). For a
summary of the broader modem view of property as a complex "bundle of rights, " see
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621, 660-67 (1998).
32. For a broader view of ownership than Hansmann offers, see A.M. Honor6, Owner
ship, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed. , 1961) (describing
various "incidents" of ownership). See also Jolin Kay & Aubrey Silberston, Corporate Gov
ernance, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW: 2, supra note 10, at 49, 52-56 (applying Ho
nore's view of ownership to companies).
SCOPE:
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capital" (p. 301), he does not adhere strictly to this contention in
most of the book. He agrees that "for the purposes at hand there
seems little point in trying to draw a strong distinction between con
tractual rights and property rights" (p. 301). Therefore, even if one
disagrees with some aspects of Hansmann's contractarian theory of
ownership, this disagreement does not detract from the contribu
tion he makes to understanding the dynamics of the ownership of
enterprise. On the contrary, Hansmann's account of ownership is
broadly consistent with a view that enterprise consists of property
as well as contracts.
C.

The Ownership of Nonprofit Enterprise

Hansmann's limited conception of ownership weakens his anal
ysis of nonprofit organizations, though he nevertheless provides an
important contribution to understanding them (pp. 227-45).
Hansmann maintains there are "no owners" of nonprofit enter
prises (p. 228), though he then explains such enterprises through an
analysis based partly on the costs of ownership (pp. 238-42). He
admits that nonprofits have no owners only "by definition," and he
again defines owners as "persons who have a share in both control
and residual earnings" (p. 228). As discussed above, this definition
of ownership is too narrow.33 Nonprofit organizations indeed own
property, even though they cannot distribute proceeds as "profits"
to patrons.34 Those who control a nonprofit organization have au
thority over its property. Nonprofits also have patrons, just as
other firms do, and these patrons make conflicting demands on the
nonprofit firm's resources. This is not to say the concept of owner
ship in nonprofit organization is unproblematic.35 Defining the
problem away, however, is not helpful.36
33. See supra section I I.B.
34. See, e.g., 1

JAMES D.

Cox ET AL., CoRPORATIONs

§ 1.18, at 1.48-49

{1995).

35. Consider, for example, the question of who owns the property of a religious institu
tion. The answer can quickly become metaphysical.
36. One promising approach to the conceptual problem of ownership of nonprofit organi
zations emphasizes the "entity" theory of organizational personality as opposed to theories
that insist on breaking down organizations into "aggregates of individuals" that compose
them. See Orts, supra note 30, at 283 n.92 (collecting sources). Unlike investor-owned firms,
nonprofit organizations have no residual owners who have a legal claim to profits. Because
distribution of earnings as profits is legally prohibited, nonprofit managers and trustees make
decisions about the use of surplus earnings for the benefit of the patrons whom the nonprofit
organization is meant to serve. The metaphysical problem of the purpose of religious institu
tions may remain. See supra, note 35. At least on the secular level, however, Hansmann is
correct to point out that nonprofit enterprises are similar to their more businesslike counter
parts in responding to conflicting claims of their patrons. In this sense, the ownership of
enterprise is a flexible concept - as Hansmann emphasizes - and its structure varies ac
cording to economic circumstances and the demands of patrons. At least in philanthropic
nonprofit organizations, such as educational or religious institutions, the influence of inter
pretations of the purpose and objective of an enterprise by decisionmakers is also important.
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Nevertheless, Hansmann's contribution, drawing on previous
work that he has done in this area, is important.37 Too often, schol
ars ignore the organizational principles and practices of nonprofit
enterprise.38 Nonprofits play a significant role not only in organiza
tions devoted to charity, religion, and politics, but also in business.
By one estimate, nonprofits account for approximately fifteen per
cent of total GNP.39 They supply two-thirds of all hospital care,
half of children's day care, a quarter of nursing care, a fifth of col
lege education, and a tenth of primary and secondary education (p.
227). Hansmann applies his calculus of the costs of contracting and
ownership to account for this significant presence of nonprofit orga
nizations in the economy (pp. 228-44). His interesting conclusion is
that nonprofit organizations do not exist simply because of tax ex
emptions and other government benefits (p. 244). Other economic
advantages, including solutions to collective action and public
goods problems, help to explain the persistence of the nonprofit
form.4o

D.

The Missing Business Corporation

A virtue of Hansmann's microanalytic approach in The Owner
is that it canvasses the many forms of organiza
tion that present alternatives to the business corporation.
Nonprofit corporations, cooperatives of various sorts, and other in
teresting coalitions fill the pages of the book. Almost as a by
product of his analysis, Hansmann describes the business
corporation as "a capital cooperative."41 It is puzzling that

ship of Enterprise

Perhaps for business enterprises as well, a view of purpose and objective broader than eco
nomic gain should play a role. See infra section III.D, Part V.
37. See Henry B.Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA.L. REV.
497 {1981); Henry B.Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
38. See Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1578,
1583 {1992) ("For many years, only tax specialists and a few cognoscenti appreciated the
unique legal issues related to nonprofit corporations. Only recently has the rest of the bar
come to recognize that representing nonprofit corporations constitutes a separate legal disci
pline....The academic literature in this field has mushroomed, and law schools have begun
to integrate the field into their curricula.").
39. See id. at 1581. No doubt using a stricter definition, Hansmann gives a significantly
lower estimate, but it confirms a rapidly increasing trend. By his account, relying on figures
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the share of GNP accounted for by the nonprofit sector
rose from 1.1 % in 1929, to 2.8% in 1974, and to 3.6% in 1988. P. 227.
40. Pp.239-41. Nonprofit organizations are also a common form of enterprise because
the legal definition of nonprofit is easily met. Nonprofits need not serve a charitable or
philanthropic purpose. They can be run in order to make money, though they cannot legally
distribute earnings as profits to investors. P. 228. This nondistribution constraint does not
prevent nonprofits from paying handsome salaries to executives, managers, and other
employees.
41. P. 14. In a business corporation, according to Hansmann, stockholders contribute
capital like any other lender, except that "the fixed rate paid on loans from the firm's lender
members ...is typically set at zero for the sake of convenience, thus obscuring the fact that
the members' contributions of capital are, in effect, loans." P.14. Hansmann concludes that
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Hansmann does not extend his treatment of the business corpora
tion, given its prominence. He limits himself to a short account of
the advantages of "investor-owned firms" (pp. 53-64). However
important they are becoming, nonprofit organizations and other al
ternatives represent only a small portion of economic activity com
pared to the organizational behemoth of the late twentieth century,
the for-profit business corporation.42
Hansmann does masterful work in microanalysis. He suggests a
useful theoretical framework to examine the organization of actual
firms. He provides a convincing analysis of why the investor-owned
corporation often has advantages - in terms of the costs of con
tracting and ownership - over other forms of enterprise. Corpora
tions owned by shareholders usually have lower costs of contracting
for capital than firms financed only through debt because creditors
cannot as easily control the risks of managerial opportunism (pp.
53-56). In terms of the costs of ownership, the principal advantage
of corporations owned by shareholders lies in the "homogeneity of
interests" of maximizing profits and shareholder value (pp. 62-63,
288).43 But Hansmann leaves the organizational punchline of his
book undeveloped. It is important as well to look at broader devel
opments at the level 'of ownership and control of large business cor
porations, the work horses in most capitalist economies.
The omission of a more extended treatment of business corpora
tions can be forgiven, however, because the major contribution of
The Ownership of Enterprise is to expand thinking about how en
terprise is structured to meet the needs of its patrons. In this objec
tive, Hansmann succeeds brilliantly. He demonstrates that investor
ownership of enterprise should be subjected to critical analysis, not
simply taken for granted. Alternatives to investor ownership may
better serve the various patrons of enterprise in different situations.
The viability and efficiency of these alternatives depend on the kind
of enterprise and its social and economic circumstances.44
JIJ.

THE MA.CROANALYSIS

OF ENTERPRISE

In contrast to Hansmann's approach, a macroanalysis of enter
prise organization should include four important social develop
ments of the twentieth century. Two are uncontroversial: the rise
"a business corporation is just a particular type of cooperative ... in which ownership is
assigned to a group of the firm's patrons, and the persons who lend capital to a firm are just
one among various classes of patrons with whom the firm deals." P. 15.
42.

See infra section III. A.
see supra note 15 and

43. But

accompanying text.

44. Different circumstances include different countries. To an extent, Hansmann draws
on international evidence to support his conclusions. p. 7. Examples include worker owner
ship and codetermination, pp. 98-105, 110-112, farm marketing cooperatives, p. 122, con
sumer retail cooperatives, pp. 163·64, utilities, pp. 180-81, and life insurance, p. 285.
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to dominance of the business corporation as an organizational form
in the global economy and the increasing importance of institu
tional investor-owners of these corporations. In Institutional Share
holders and Corporate Governance, G.P. Stapledon45 focuses on
these developments in a comparative study of Great Britain and
Australia. In my view, two additional macroanalytic developments
in enterprise organization also deserve attention: the effects that
corporate ownership patterns may have on the distribution of
wealth in society and the effects that legal imperatives in corporate
governance may have on ethical decisionmaking. Each of these
four large-scale developments are briefly reviewed, and then
Stapledon's contribution to understanding them is considered.
A.

The Dominance of the Business Corporation

This century, the for-profit business corporation became the pri
mary engine of economic enterprise in the world.46 By 1990, busi
ness corporations accounted for more than ninety percent of total
sales and receipts in the United States, and the 7000 largest corpo
rations, with assets of $250 million or more, accounted for more
than half of all sales and receipts.47 The corporate form has also
become dominant abroad.48 The largest business firms in most
countries are corporations.49
In the late twentieth century, the exponential growth of multina
tional or transnational corporate enterprise qualifies as one of the
most important historical developments.so From 1969 to 1990, the
45. Lecturer in Law and Associate of the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regu
lation, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne.
46. For the classic history of the rise of the corporate form in the United States, see
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF TIIE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN TIIE LAW OF
TIIE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 {1970). For a more general historical account, see SruART
BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE {1990).

0

47. See Carl Kaysen, Introduction and Overview, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION To.
DAY 3, 5 {Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). Reasons for "the dominance of the corporate form of
organization " include flexibility of capital structure, central management, limited liability,
and free transferability of equity ownership in shares. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, COR
PORATE LAW § 1.1 {1986).
48. See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Mulitnational Corpo·
rations, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283, 285-87 {1990); Kaysen, Introduction and Overview, supra
note 47, at 3-4. Today, Russia, China, and Eastern European countries have also adopted
Western-style corporation laws. See Hendrik F.Jordaan, A Comparative Analysis of Corpo·
rate Fiduciary Laws, 31 INTL. LAW. 133, 134 (1997).
49. For a survey, see INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS, CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS, vols. 1-3 {Koen Geens ed., 1997).
50. See ED WARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
1-31 {1996); Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 247, 247-52 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). According to the World
Bank, the share of total global output produced by multinational affiliates increased from
4.5% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1995, and their share of global manufacturing output increased from
12% in 1977 to 18% in 1992. Martin Wolf, The Heart of the New World Economy, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at 12.
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number of multinationals tripled from around 7000 to almost
These multinational corporations are often structured as
parent-subsidiary groups.s2 By 1994, there were approximately
37,000 multinational parents, which accounted for more than
200,000 foreign affiliates or subsidiaries.s3 The largest 300 multina
tional corporations account for about one quarter of the world's
total productive assets.s4 Half of all parents of multinational groups
are incorporated in one of four countries: the United States, Great
Britain, Germany, or Japan.ss

24,00o.si

B.

The Rise of Institutional Investors

A second macroanalytic trend in the organization of corporate
enterprise is the increasing concentration of share ownership in in
stitutional investors.s6 These institutions include public and private
pension funds, mutual investment funds, insurance companies, and
banks. Collectively, they hold more than half the stock of public
corporations in the United States, and even greater percentages of
some of the largest corporations.s7 The data indicate a sea change
in the last half of the century. In 1950, institutions held only 8% of
the total equity of corporations in the United States. The percent
age increased to 33% in 1980, 45% in 1988, and 53% in 1990.ss In
other countries, notably Great Britain, institutional holdings are
even larger.s9
The rise of institutional investors carries the potential to change
the balance of power in corporate governance. The prospect that
51. See DeAnne Julius, International Direct Investment: Strengthening the Policy Regime,
in MANAGING THE WoRI.D EcoNoMY 269, 276 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994).
52. See Al.FRED F. CoNARD, CoRPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 168-69 (1976); DETLEV F.
V AGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 129 (1986).
53. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., WoRLD lNvEsTMENT REPORT, 1994:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKPLACE at 3-5 & tbl. 1.1,
U.N. Doc.UNCTA D/ DCTI/10, U.N.Sales No.E.94.11.A.14 (1994).
54. See Back in Fashion, ECONOMIST, Mar.27, 1993, at 5-6. The largest 100 multination
als hold one fifth of global assets. See Wolf, supra note 50.
55. See U.N.DEPT. OF EcoN. & S oc. DEv., WoRLD lNvEsTMENT REPORT, 1992: TRANS
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ENGINES OF GRowrn: at 13 box 1.1 n.1, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/
130, U.N.Sales No.E.92.11.A. (1992).
56. Robert Clark describes the growth of institutional investors and financial in
termediaries as the "third stage" of capitalism, arriving after the rise of the corporate form in
the "first stage " and the professionalization of corporate managers in the "second stage." See
Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARV.L. REV. 561, 562-64 (1981) (book review essay).
57. See CAROLYN K.BRANCATO, THE BRANCATO REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL lNvEsTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE USA, Sept.1996, at 4; Co
LUMBIA CENTER FOR L AW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT,
THE GRowrn: OF INSTITUTIONAL INvESToRs IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS (1988).
58. See John C.Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corpo
rate Monitor, 91 CoLUM.L.REv. 1277, 1291 (1991).
59. Stapledon reports that institutions own 60% of British public corporations. P. 5.
.
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institutional ownership may close the famous "separation of owner
ship and control" in public corporations60 provokes vigorous discus
sion among legal academics in the United States. The predominant
view cheers the rise of institutional shareholders but also recognizes
that legal reform is needed for their potential power to be real
ized.61 Other scholars argue that even with legal reforms institu
tional investors may not have an economic interest in exerting
influence over corporate managers.62 At least, the rise of institu
tional investors has changed corporate culture in the United States
in the sense that managers now pay more serious attention to share
holders' interests than they did before.63
The growth of institutional investors has also begun to influence
views of corporate governance abroad through the rapid interna
tionalization of the capital markets.64 Institutional investors in the
United States, Europe, and elsewhere seek to invest increasing
amounts of capital throughout the world. This dynamic creates
pressure that "disturbs preexisting factual and legal patterns of
owner-manager relations within private firms" in different coun
tries.65 Stapledon gives an example of this trend in his study of in
stitutional investors in Australia. British and U.S. foreign investors
now own twenty-nine percent of outstanding shares of Australian
corporations (p. 5).
C.

Effects on the Distribution of Wealth

A third macroanalytic development concerns the effects that a
dominant pattern of corporate organization and concentrated
shareholder ownership may have on the distribution of wealth in
60. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933).
61. See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 117 (1988); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 520 (1990) (arguing that institutional shareholder activism is possible but requires
certain legal reforms); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992) (arguing that institutional shareholder
activism is not only possible with legal reform but desirable as a matter of policy); Coffee,
supra note 58 (arguing that institutional investors are unlikely to tradeoff liquidity for control
and outlining legal changes that would encourage them to do so).
62. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (arguing that agency costs and conflicts of
interest, as well as legal rules, fail to give institutional investors incentives to discipline corpo
rate managers).
63. See MICHAEL UsEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 10-11 (1996).
64. For accounts of the extent and causes of the internationalization of capital markets in
the last few decades, see Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure
Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 241, 243, 247-57; Richard A. Grasso,
Globalization of the Equity Markets, 20 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 1108, 1110-14 (1997).
65. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and
57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991).
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society. In a recent article, Professor Jeffrey Gordon highlights the
fact that even though, in real terms, corporate profits and stock
market prices increased 250% in the United States from 1980 to
1995, wages did not increase at all except for people in the top quin
tile of income, and the distribution of income has become more un
equal.66 Average wages for rank-and-file employees have in fact
declined from 1980 to 1996.67 In contrast to the happy days of the
1950s and 1960s, when "income for all income groups was rising and
inequality was decreasing," we seem now to be living in a time
when "shareholders are gaining and workers are not."68 Gordon
suggests a small solution that would enable employees to partici
pate better in stock market gains through their retirement pen
sions,69 but the phenomenon of soaring stocks and stagnating wages
also implicates larger questions of the social organization of corpo
rate enterprise, investment, and employment.
. International trends in the distribution of income are also well
known and intractable, dividing the globe into "first" and "third"
worlds with radically different economic prospects and expectations
of quality of life. Some economies in a transitional "second" world
struggle for admission to privileged "first" world status, but in gen
eral the inequality of wealth between people in rich and poor na
tions continues to increase.70 Although multinational enterprises
play an important role in raising the average standard of living,71
66. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees,
CoLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1534 (1997).
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67. From 1980 to 1996, average hourly wages in constant 1982 dollars fell in the United
States from $7.78 to $7.42, and average weekly wages declined from $275 to $256. Bureau of
the Census, U.S. Dept. of Co=erce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, at 429. I
thank Kent Greenfield for pointing me to these figures.
68. Gordon, supra note 66, at 1526, 1534. While average wages have been declining, see
supra note 67 and accompanying text, there is a controversy about the accuracy of the Labor
Department's consumer price index, which is the index most often used for inflation adjust
ments. Other price indices, such as the Co=erce Department's price index for personal
consumption expenditures, and net gains in the worth of benefits for workers suggest that
average real pay for workers has been "flat rather than declining between the early 1970s and
early 1990s." John M. Berry, Think the Boom Has Left Workers Behind? Think Again,
WASH. PoST. Aug. 7, 1997, at El.
69. Specifically, Gordon reco=ends a "pension equity collar" that would guarantee a
minimum return to employees that approximates long-term average projected equity return
while giving those who create this financial instrument any gain in excess of long-term aver
ages. See id. at 1519, 1562-66.
70. According to one estimate, the ratio of income in the world between the richest 20%
of people and the poorest 20% increased from 30-to-1 in 1960 to 60-to-1 in 1990. See Gerald
Epstein, Power, Profits, and Cooperation in the Global Economy, in CREATING A NEW
WORLD ECONOMY: FORCES OF CHANGE & PLANS FOR ACTION 19, 22-23, 25 fig. 1.4 (Gerald
Epstein et al. eds., 1993).
71. See Robert Chote, Risks Outweighed by Gains, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at 9 (dis
cussing evidence that multinational investment brings spillover benefits as well as direct con
tributions to income and employment in developing countries); Andrew E. Serwer, The End
of the World ls Nigh - Or ls It?, FORTUNE, May 2, 1994, at 123 ("In almost any way you
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billions of people are left out of the emerging global business
civilization.72

D.

Enterprise Ethics

A fourth macroanalytic dimension of change concerns the ef
fects that an increasingly concentrated corporate economy driven
by the interests of large institutional investors may have on non
economic or "social" issues. Although the rise of institutional in
vestors promises to discipline managers,73 their influence aims to
increase economic competitiveness and bottom-line returns. This
has obvious social benefits, but the increasing pressure on corpora
tions for economic performance may also reduce the discretion that
corporate managers have to balance economic decisionmaking with
ethical considerations. In other words, the scope for corporate so
cial responsibility may be narrowed. To give only one important
example, the economic imperatives of institutional investors may
lead to a systemic conflict with corporate governance practices and
initiatives designed to protect the natural environment.74 This det
rimental macroanalytic trend may call for nontraditional regulatory
solutions that include adjustments within the law of enterprise
organization.75

IV.

STAPLEDON'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MACROANALYSIS OF
CORPORATE ENTERPRISE

Although Stapledon's Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
does not paint with a brush as broad as the macroanal
ysis outlined above, it nevertheless contributes to understanding
two large trends in enterprise organization. First, Stapledon's de
tailed account of corporate governance in Great Britain and Aus
tralia confirms the international trend toward the dominance of the
corporate form. Second and more importantly, the book contrib
utes to a detailed understanding of the rise of institutional investors
and their influence in both countries (pp. 33-154, 157-203).

Governance

care to measure, life is getting better for people in developing nations.") (quoting Barton
Biggs, Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asset Management).
72. For a critique along these lines, see RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAOH,
GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 16 (1994) ("Of
the 5.4 billion people on earth, almost 3.6 billion have neither cash nor credit to buy much of
anything. A majority of people on the planet are at most window-shoppers.").
73.

See supra notes 60-61

and accompanying text.

74. See Buxbaum, supra note 65, at 28 (arguing that "ecological imperatives" require "a
new respect for a different, longer term vision of corporate behavior").
75. Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (1997) (arguing for collaboration between government and business in regulating en
vironmental and other behavior); Eric W. Orts , Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1227 (1995) (recommending European-style environmental management and auditing
systems to encourage corporate environmental responsibility).
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Of particular interest, Stapledon presents Australia as an inter
esting hybrid case of corporate governance between two competing
models: the "outsider" system of Great Britain and the United
States characterized by the relative activism of institutional share
holders, and the "insider" system of Germany and Japan character
ized by the relative passivity of shareholders as compared with the
dominant influence of banks.76 In other words, Australia provides a
case study of possible convergence of the leading corporate govern
ance systems in the world. Stapledon states this thesis as a conclu
sion, however, and he does not explain much further how the
details of the Australian system relate to larger corporate govern
ance issues. Instead, he is satisfied to transplant to foreign soil the
recommendations of corporate law scholars in the United States
who advocate increased monitoring of corporate boards and man
agers by institutional shareholders (pp. 285-95). But macroanalysis,
and comparative macroanalysis in particular, is very difficult given
the empirical complexity of large economic trends and the need to
master the details of different legal systems in order to assess them.
Rather than criticism on this ground, Stapledon deserves credit for
providing a good reference source for others who may examine the
Australian system of corporate governance and compare it, not only
to Great Britain, but also to the United States, Germany, and
Japan.77

V.

FOR INVESTOR OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE

THE UNEASY CASE

Reading The Ownership of Enterprise and Institutional Share
holders and Corporate Governance together leads one to think
about the likely future of enterprise organization in the twenty-first
century. From a microanalytic perspective, Hansmann's vision of
the future is flexible. The structures of enterprise will fluctuate in
accordance with the costs of contracting and ownership and in re
sponse to changes in other economic conditions, law, technology,
and culture. The likely result will be a continuing diversity of orga
nizations. Employee-owned, nonprofit, and other alternative forms
of enterprise will compete with the investor-owned paradigm. At
the macroanalytic level, Stapledon's study confirms the view of
other observers that institutional investor ownership will remain a
primary large-scale determinant of the structure of enterprise.78
76. Pp. 3-4, 279. (citing J.R. Franks & C.P. Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the
RELATIONAL INVESTING (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1996)).

International Evidence, in

77. For a useful example of this kind of comparative work, see Bernard S. Black & John
C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1997 (1994).
78.

See supra section III B.
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From different perspectives, both Hansmann and Stapledon make
the case for investor ownership as the predominant mode of enter
prise organization in the future, but this case is uneasy for two
reasons.
First, descriptively, the likely future structure of enterprise or
ganization is uncertain. Although Hansmann argues that some
form of investor ownership is often the best available alternative,
he also shows that investor ownership is not foreordained by eco
nomic logic. Alternative forms of ownership are not only possible;
they exist in large numbers in the real world. From a microanalytic
perspective, the case for investor ownership is uncertain because it
depends on the particular circumstances and preferences of the var
ious interests of patrons within firms. Investor ownership often, but
not always, makes the most economic sense.
Second, normatively, some of the larger social effects of investor
capitalism give cause for concern.79 Stapledon's macroanalysis of
corporate enterprise and institutional investors suggests that this
model of enterprise organization is destined to continue in the fu
ture on a global scale. However, some attributes of the emerging
system of investor capitalism remain uncertain. For example, the
increasing international scope of institutional investors may either
exert pressure for a convergence of "insider" and "outsider" mod
els of investor capitalism - perhaps along the lines of a hybrid such
as in Australia - or intensify competition among them.80 In addi
tion, the continuing primacy of investor-owned enterprise may
worsen social problems with respect to the relative compensation of
non-investor employees (and the unemployed) and the ability of
managers to respond to other ethical imperatives as well as to the
demands of investors.s1
Reflecting on the uneasy case for investor ownership leads me
also to conclude with two additional related themes. First, I con
sider whether a recent analysis of "the tragedy of the anticommons"
may have an application for microanalytic theories of enterprise or
ganization.82 Second, I suggest on the macroanalytic level that the
Anglo-American "outsider" investor model of the publicly held
corporation may offer the best long-term hope for solving some of
the social problems "that arise in a global system of investor
capitalism.
79. I borrow the term "investor capitalism" from Michael Useem. See supra note 63. See
Coffee, Jr., The Folklore ofInvestor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1970, 1986-88
{1997) {book review) (discussing various aspects of the uncertain future of investor
capitalism).

also John C.

80.
81.
82.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra sections III.C, III.D.
See Heller, supra note 31.
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Anticommons

Hansmann's book provides convincing microanalytic arguments
for why investor ownership proves to be relatively efficient in most
circumstances.83 In a recent article, Professor Michael Heller sug
gests a related reason for the primacy of investor ownership.s4 Hel
ler introduces a theory of property that refers to the difficulty
created when too many rights of ownership are granted in a particu
lar asset.85 This is "the tragedy of the anticommons," which con
trasts with the better known "tragedy of the commons" that can
appear when no private rights of ownership are granted in a collec
tive asset.86 As an illustration of the anticommons, Heller develops
the case of Russian storefronts in the post-communist transition pe
riod in the early 1990s.s7 Although privatization created property
rights in Russian stores, so many rights were created and distrib
uted that nobody possessed a "core bundle" of ownership rights to
make the stores useful.SS Because the newly privatized storefront
properties had too many owners, they could not be used effi
ciently.89 Instead, metal kiosks cropped up outside empty
storefronts on the streets of Moscow and. other Russian cities.90

An analogous story may be told about the structure of enter
prise organization. Hansmann treats the problem of ownership of
enterprise in terms of the costs of managerial opportunism, collec
tive decisionmaking, risk bearing, and transition.91 Heller suggests
another perspective on the ownership of enterprise that reinforces
Hansmann's emphasis on the costs of collective decisionmaking.
Lawmakers should avoid creating "a tragedy of the anticommons"
83.

See supra text accompanying notes

15-16 & 43.

84. See Heller, supra note 31. For the gestation of my application of Heller's idea of the
anticommons to the firm, I credit conversations with Heller, as well as Merritt Fox and
Deborah Malamud.
85. See id. at 624 ("In an anticommons, . . . multiple owners are each endowed with the
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.
When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to un
deruse - a tragedy of the anticommons.") (footnotes omitted).
86. The classic article is Garrett Hardin,
(1968).

The Tragedy of the Commons,

162 SCIENCE 1243

87. Heller, supra note 31, at 622-24, 633-47. Heller also adduces other examples of
anticommons property in modem-day Canada, Japan, and the United States. Id. at 679
n.259, 682-84, 684-85.
88.

See id.

at 622-24, 632-42.

89.

See id.

at 622-23, 633-42.

90. See id. at 622-23, 642-45. The same phenomenon of kiosks in front of empty stores
occurred elsewhere in postcommunist Eastern Europe, such as Poland, but lasted for a
shorter time. See id. at 634 & n.65, 647 n.119.
91.

See supra

section I.B.
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in the ownership structures of enterprise.92 Effective governance of
an enterprise requires a "core bundle" of ownership rights held by a
relatively coherent group of patrons.93 As Hansmann demon
strates, this core group of patrons need not be equity investors; em
ployees or manager-owners may step forward to fill this role.
Whoever the "core" ownership group may be, an anticommons per
spective suggests that the law of enterprise organization should not
split ownership rights into so many parts that no one can exercise
effective control.94
These lessons from Hansmann and Heller should give pause to
those who advocate a radical communitarian restructuring of the
public corporation.95 Overregulation of publicly held corporations
would likely lead investors, managers, or employees to preserve the
efficient "core bundle" of ownership rights by taking firms private
through leveraged buyouts or simply leaving a public corporation
and starting fresh as a new closely owned firm.96 If these alterna
tives were legally barred, then a fate similar to that of vacant
storefronts and flimsy kiosks in Russia might be recreated on a
larger and more detrimental scale in enterprise organization.

B.

The Virtues of the Public Corporation

From a macroanalytic point of view, the uncertain future of en
terprise organization centers largely on whether any particular form
of investor capitalism will prevail. Public corporations with a large
number of equity shareholders are not always the rule. In other
countries, most notably Germany and Japan, corporations usually
depend instead on concentrated share ownership by large banks
and other corporations.97 To borrow from Hansmann, but to make
92. Heller makes this point specifically with respect to the privatization of enterprise in
China and Eastern Europe. See Heller, supra note 31, at 680-82. I suggest that his approach
might be expanded to apply to the law of enterprise organization more generally.
93. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text.
94. One may think that nonprofit organization threatens to splinter ownership rights, and
this is true to an extent. See supra section 11.C. Because profits in the enterprise cannot be
distributed, however, the nonprofit structure effectively centralizes rights of control over the
entity's ownership of assets in the board of trustees or a similar structure, while constraining
the extent to which those in control may deplete the assets of the firm.
95. For a thoughtful introduction to this literature, see David Millon, Communitarianism

in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
50, at 1, 22-31.
96. This analysis may explain the relative rarity of public corporations in countries, such
as Germany, that mandate employee representation on corporate boards. See infra note 97
and supra note 24 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927, 1936-48 (1993); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark
J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 882-95 (1993) (description of Japanese system);
Friedrich K. Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 51
BROOK. L. REv. 97, 97-102 (1991) (description of German system).
LAw, supra note
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the point in a larger context, the future structure of corporate enter
prise is also in this sense "contingent."98
In my view, the triumph of investor capitalism in the global
economy since the Second Russian Revolution and the end of the
Cold War99 will not lead to a convergence of forms of organization,
much less "the end of history." 100 Instead, it is more likely that a
competition among different forms of investor capitalism and dif
ferent varieties of investor-owned enterprise will continue into the
next century.101 The increasing globalization of both corporate or
ganization and capital markets will most likely sharpen this
competition.102
The practice in comparative corporate governance of making fu
ture predictions has proven treacherous for those scholars who
have engaged in it. Only a few years ago, the "insider" system of
investor capitalism in Germany and Japan looked good to legal the
orists imbued with the doctrines of agency costs theory. According
to this theory, a few large consolidated investors could better moni
tor managers than the dispersed shareholders in the Anglo-Ameri
can model. Given the anemic condition of the German and
Japanese economies as of this writing, however, the corporate gov
ernance system of "outsider" investors in the United States and
Great Britain now looks comparatively good.
Capitalism is cyclical, and economic predictions are dangerous.
It is not possible to predict with any certainty whether the "insider"
or "outsider" model will prevail in the future. Perhaps both will
coexist in different cultures and circumstances. Or perhaps Austra98. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7.
99. There are minor exceptions, such as in North Korea and Cuba, and the partial excep
tion of the large communist-capitalist experiment in China.

100. But see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
For an argument that corporate governance regimes are not likely to converge internation
ally in the near future because of cultural and legal path dependence, see Lucian Bebchuk &
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY, supra note 24, at 565.
101. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GooD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPOR
ATE GOVERNANCE IN FrVE COUNTRIES (1994) (comparing Germany, Japan, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States); CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & FoNs
TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CuLTURES OF CAPITALISM: VALUE SYSTEMS FOR CREATING
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, BRITAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE
NETHERLANDS (1993) (popular and informal account of differences in economic systems
based largely on interviews with corporate executives); LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD To
HEAD: THE CoMING ECONOMIC BATTI..E AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA 247
(1992) (arguing that a competition among competing forms of capitalism will characterize the
next century); Owen M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INTL. L. 908, 919 (1992)
("A battle still needs to be fought. It will not be the battle that has dominated the twentieth
century, between capitalism and socialism, but rather a battle within capitalism. Passions
might not run as high, for the divisions are less clear-cut, but the stakes and concerns are
every bit as great")
102. See supra notes 48-55

&

64-65

and accompanying text.
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lian-style hybrids will arise that combine the best aspects of both
models.103 Future work in the macroanalysis of enterprise organi
zation should examine this important choice between different
kinds of capitalism.
From a normative macroanalytic perspective, my tentative pref
erence - recognizing my possible cultural bias - favors the
Anglo-American model of the public· corporation for two reasons
related to the macroanalytic trends outlined above. First, this
model permits the development of mechanisms to enable most peo
ple in the world economy to participate in the success of corporate
enterprise. The relatively open structure of public corporations en
courages widespread participation by average citizens who may in
vest in them through pensions, insurance, or investments of savings
in mutual funds. Public corporations enable the "fourth stage of
capitalism" heralded by Dean Robert Clark, which contemplates and in part is already achieving - a world in which the benefits of
corporate enterprise are shared by a broad range of people, not
only wealthy individuals and corporate chieftains.104 The develop
ment of fourth-stage capitalism is nascent, however, and nothing
guarantees the continued dominance of the public corporation over
other models of investor ownership.
The second reason that I believe the "outsider" model of institu
tional investors and public corporations offers the best hope for the
evolution of a humane future is that this model will more likely give
scope for ethical considerations in corporate decisionmaking.
Although many legal scholars call for institutional investors to
tighten the economic reins on public corporations, ethical consider
ations should also continue to play an important role in corporate
management. Currently, we may have already begun to witness the
effects of a system of enterprise organization that focuses too exclu
sively on the interests of investors to the harm of other important
social interests. The public corporation, even with its various "dis
eases,"105 offers the best alternative for addressing these social con
cerns at the same time as it pursues the central wealth-producing
function of business. Public corporations owned by a broad range
103. The strength of the case for Australia as a corporate governance hybrid depends in
part on its future economic success. One observer describes Australia as "having an infinite
capacity to disappoint." Tony Walker, Fortune's Favour Frittered Away, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1997, Survey on Australia, at 1. At least with respect to corporate governance, however,
changes are in progress. Banking has been deregulated. See Elizabeth Robinson, Big Four
Called to Account, Fm. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, Survey on Australia, at 4. And individual share
ownership has increased to include more than one-third of the population in response partly
to privatizations and reform of Australia's main stock exchange, the ASX. Elizabeth Robin
son, Sharecroppers to Shareholders, Fm. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, Survey on Australia, at 4.
104. Clark, supra note 56, at 565-69.
105. Alfred F. Conard, Theses for a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 259,
262-79 (1986) (diagnosing various illnesses from "abuses of control" to "the profit fixation").
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of investors are more likely to include the public interest, as well as
private gain, as an objective in doing business compared with large
corporations that are closely held by only a few very wealthy indi
viduals.106 A diverse body of individual owners will exert pressure
to address various interests of social concern, often through differ
ent kinds of institutional investors.107 In addition, securities regula
tion of public corporations often requires disclosure of information
in annual and quarterly financial reports that focuses public opinion
on issues of public interest. Recent examples include an emphasis
on reporting information about executive compensation108 and en
vironmental liabilities.109 A diverse and numerous group of owners
with access to significant information about the social as well as fi
nancial performance of public corporations increases the likelihood
that they will act as good institutional citizens.110
CONCLUSION

From different perspectives, Henry Hansmann and G.P.
Stapledon support the view that investor capitalism will continue to
provide the primary mode of enterprise organization in the twenty
first century. Their analysis does not, however, provide answers to
some troubling social issues. A broad view of the law of enterprise
organization should continue to address these issues from both
micro- and macroanalytic perspectives.111 This approach suggests a
106. The American Law lnstitute's Principles of Corporate Governance recognizes that
"a corporation should have as its object the conduct of business activities" that includes "eth
ical considerations" as well as "enhancing profit and shareholder gain." PRINCIPLES OF COR
PORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND R:scoMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1992). The ALI also
observes that "ethical considerations reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct of business necessarily include ethical responsibilities that may be owed to persons
other than shareholders with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as em
ployees, customers, suppliers, and members of the co=unities within which the corporation
operates." Id. § 2.01 cmt. h. Corporate constituency statutes enacted in most states confirnI
the permissibility of a broad view of the objective of corporations. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. R:sv. 14, 2635, 90-92, 134-35 (1992).
107. In this respect, the

difference between public and private pension funds is well
known. Public funds tend to be much more aggressive in pursuing issues that they see as in
the public interest than private funds which are usually controlled by corporate managers.
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. R:sv. 75,

78 (1993).
108. See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1997).
109. See, e.g., John W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Lia
bility and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 225, 287-337 (1995); Elizabeth Ann
Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public Companies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HAR.v. ENVrL. L. R:sv. 129, 130-69 (1992).
110. Cf. James B. White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of
Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416, 1423 (1985) (arguing that "good citizen

ship" requires recognition of the fact that a corporation is the "center of a web of mutually
beneficial relations extending in many directions").

111. See supra

text accompanying notes
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merger of traditionally separate legal disciplines in the United
States: combining, for ex�mple, corporate, employment, and labor
law in the German sense of Unternehmensrecht ("enterprise
law").112 If a label for this research agenda is desired, one might
refer to a "neo-liberalism" that advocates "the widest possible own
ership of shares as a means for reducing further the class conflict
and improving the working of the 'social market economy' (soziale
Marktwirtschaft). "113 As Jeffrey Gordon writes, "society should
work in a way that benefits all of its economic groups."114 Environ
mental and other ethical concerns should also be included in the
equation. This approach to the law of enterprise organization seeks
a middle course between the historically discredited doctrines of so
cialism and nationalism, on one hand, and the harsh social conse
quences of an unfettered global investor capitalism, on the other.
A turn of legal research in this direction may help to find methods
to harness corporate enterprises and their owners, including institu
tional investors, more strongly in the social interest.

112. See Eruc STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws: NATIONAL RE
FORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION 93 (1971); Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism
and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1163, 1163 n.4 (1984).
113. STEIN, supra note 112, at 97. Some movement in this direction is discernible in both
recent practice and scholarship. See, e.g., Roger E. Alcaly, Reinventing the Corporation, N.Y.
REv. OF BooKS, Apr. 10, 1997, at 38 (arguing that a "major new development in the relations
between American workers and businesses has been quietly taking place" which exhibits "a
trend toward a new kind of corporate culture in which the interests of managers, sharehold
ers, and workers are closely and deliberately linked" through mechanisms such as profit
sharing and employee stock ownership plans).
114. Gordon,

supra

note 66, at 1520.

